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I. INTRODUCTION AND ROAD MAP 
In April 2016, after years of drafting and negotiations, the European 
Union (EU) finally passed the General Data Protection Regulation (“the 
GDPR” or “the Regulation”).1  Ever since, regulators, businesses and 
citizens in Europe and far beyond are grappling with the difficult task of 
establishing the legal regime which will follow from the GDPR’s entry into 
force in May 2018.2  The GDPR’s impact will, most likely, be profound.  It 
is perhaps the most comprehensive and forward looking piece of legislation 
to address the challenges facing data protection in the digital age.  It replaces3 
the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD),4 and is set to guide the EU 
throughout the next few decades. 
 
* Vice Dean and Professor – University of Haifa.  I thank Gaia Bernstein, Frederik Borgesius, 
Courtney Bowman, Mireille Hildebrandt, Bart van der Sloot, as well as Chelsea Ott, the 
members of the Seton Hall Law Review and the participants of “The New EU Data Protection 
Regulation: Transnational Enforcement and its Effects on U.S. Businesses” Symposium at 
Seton Hall Law School (September 2016) for their helpful comments. 
  1   Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection 
of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Advancement of Such Data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. L 119/1 [hereinafter 
the General Data Protection Regulations or GDPR]. 
  2   Id. art. 99, at 87–88.  
  3   Id. art. 94(1), at 86.  
  4   Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. L 281/32 [hereinafter DPD]. 
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The GDPR enters into force at a crucial time for the digital economy 
and ecosystem; one in which substantial risks to rights and liberties are 
emerging, while at the same time vast opportunities to create value, promote 
welfare, and enhance various social objectives are unfolding.  Enacting 
complex regulation pertaining to a rapidly changing environment is always 
a challenging task and the data protection context is certainly one that is 
constantly in flux and is, therefore, no exception. 
Among the challenges data protection law faces in the digital age, the 
emergence of Big Data is perhaps the greatest: this term refers to the 
practices of creating and analyzing vast datasets, which at times include 
personal information.  Indeed, Big Data analysis carries both hope and 
potential harm to the individuals whose data is analyzed, as well as other 
individuals indirectly affected by such analyses.  These novel developments 
call for both conceptual and practical changes in the current legal setting.5  
Unfortunately, the GDPR fails to properly address the surge in Big Data 
practices.  The GDPR’s provisions are—to borrow a key term used 
throughout EU data protection regulation—incompatible with the data 
environment that the availability of Big Data generates.6  Such 
incompatibility is destined to render many of the GDPR’s provisions quickly 
irrelevant.  Alternatively, the GDPR’s enactment could substantially alter the 
way Big Data analysis is conducted, transferring it to one that is suboptimal 
and inefficient.  It will do so while stalling innovation in Europe and limiting 
utility to European citizens, while not necessarily providing such citizens 
with greater privacy protection.7 
To defend and explain the provocative assertions noted above and the 
conclusions that derive from them, this article (“Article”) proceeds as 
follows: after this brief introduction (Part I), Part II quickly defines Big Data 
and its relevance to EU data protection law.  Part III addresses four central 
concepts of EU data protection law as manifested in the GDPR: Purpose 
Specification, Data Minimization, Automated Decisions and Special 
Categories.  It thereafter proceeds to demonstrate that the treatment of every 
one of these concepts in the GDPR is lacking and in fact incompatible with 
the prospects of Big Data analysis.  Many of these points have been made by 
 
  5   Bart van der Sloot & Sascha van Schendel, Ten Questions for Future Regulation of 
Big Data: A Comparative and Empirical Legal Study, 7 JIPITEC 29 (2016), http://www 
.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-7-2-2016/4438 (illustrating which countries are considering novel 
regulation to approach the challenges of Big Data).  
  6   See, e.g., DPD, supra note 4, art. 6(1)(b), at 40; GDPR, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(b), at 
35. 
  7   See Tal Z. Zarsky, The Privacy–Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
115, 161 (2015) [hereinafter Zarsky, The Privacy–Innovation Conundrum], for a full analysis 
of this argument.  
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European commentators and even regulators.8  However, this Article 
highlights the central concerns and argues that these problems are 
substantial, even incurable.  It does so by selecting the most crucial critiques 
which the age of Big Data generates, carefully examining their components, 
and framing them in the most convincing manner.  Part IV concludes by 
discussing the aggregated effect of such incompatibilities on regulated 
entities, the EU, and society in general. 
This Article’s focus is on legal analysis.  It therefore does not provide 
a systematic discussion as to the reasons that led to the GDPR’s 
incompatibility, which are most likely varied and range from the political to 
the economic.9  Yet it is important to note that the incompatibility here 
discussed most likely resulted from a conscious policy decision, rather than 
from the EU decision-makers’ misunderstanding of what lies ahead or mere 
regulatory neglect.  As opposed to the conditions surrounding the enactment 
of the 1995 DPD, which pre-dated much of the Big Data revolution, a rich 
and vibrant discussion regarding the effects and implications of Big Data has 
unfolded in Europe over the last few years.10  Indeed, the GDPR, in general, 
is premised on deep philosophical convictions regarding the extent to which 
the specific rights of both individuals and groups must be protected in the 
digital age.11  Furthermore, as part of the GDPR’s drafting process, firms 
engaging in Big Data (and their relevant associations) voiced their concerns 
 
  8   See Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L 
DATA PRIVACY L. 74, 74 (2013), https://academic.oup.com/idpl/article-lookup/doi/10.1093 
/idpl/ips036 (noting that the “Big Data tsunami” will “overwhelm” the EU’s reform efforts).  
See also Big Data – Privacy Principles Under Pressure, DATATILSYNET 42–44 (Sept. 2013), 
https://www.datatilsynet.no/globalassets/global/04_planer_rapporter/big-data-engelsk-
web.pdf (displaying a report of Norwegian Data Protection Authority). 
  9   For such an analysis of the GDPR’s article 22, see Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt 
& Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not 
Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, SSRN 9–10 (2016), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2903469.  In the context of purpose specification, see Lokke Moerel & Corien Prins, 
Privacy for the Homo Digitalis: Proposal for a New Regulatory Framework for Data 
Protection in the Light of Big Data and the Internet of Things, SSRN 51–52 (May 25, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2784123. 
  10   See, e.g., Paul de Hert & Hans Lammerant, Predictive Profiling and Its Legal Limits: 
Effectiveness Gone Forever?, in THE NETH. COUNCIL FOR GOV’T POLICY, WRR, EXPLORING 
THE BOUNDARIES OF BIG DATA 145 (Bart van der Sloot, Dennis Broeders & Erik Schrijvers 
eds., 2016); Antoinette Rouvroy, “Of Data and Men”: Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in 
a World of Big Data, COUNCIL OF EUR., DIRECTORATE GEN. OF HUM. RTS. AND RULE OF L., at 
11 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTM 
Content?documentId=09000016806a6020. 
  11   See Colin J. Bennett & Robin M. Bayley, Privacy Protection in the Era of ‘Big Data’: 
Regulatory Challenges and Social Assessments, in EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF BIG DATA 
205, 212 (2016) (“The GDPR contains a more accurate and faithful expression of the various 
policy instruments that currently comprise the ‘governance of privacy’ . . .  It is rooted in the 
traditions of European data protection law, but it also borrows from policy innovations first 
introduced in countries outside Europe.”).  
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regarding the impact of various contemplated GDPR provisions to the 
relevant decision-makers.12 
The critical discussion to follow is therefore a call to all relevant 
regulators to account for the insights here discussed and reconsider the 
balance reached in the GDPR and the ideological convictions behind them, 
to the greatest extent.  It does not merely write off the EU’s political 
convictions and its reliance on fundamental rights which also include privacy 
and data protection.  Rather, it strives to clearly articulate what the impact of 
the GDPR’s implementation on Big Data practices would be, arguing that it 
would be substantial and highly problematic.  Even through the GDPR’s text 
is final, a critical discussion of its content is far from futile, even on the 
practical/policy level.  There will be plenty of opportunities to engage in 
changes, as over the next few years, courts, national legislators and 
regulators will respond to, interpret and enforce the new regulation.  Thus, 
the policy and legal position taken when drafting the GDPR might still shift 
and evolve.  Therefore, the time to discuss these pressing matters is certainly 
now. 
II. A BRIEF PRIMER ON BIG DATA AND THE LAW 
Industry leaders’ proclamations, as well as publications in the popular 
and academic press, continuously announce that the age of Big Data is upon 
us13—a tectonic change in the way data is collected, analyzed and applied in 
the digital era.  When striving to define the “Big Data” concept, the 
professional literature refers to the four Vs: the Volume of data collected, the 
 
  12   Jennifer Baker, EU Data Protection Proposals Taken Word for Word from US 
Lobbyists, TECHWORLD (Feb. 12, 2013),  
http://www.techworld.com/news/security/eu-data-protection-proposals-taken-word-for-
word-from-us-lobbyists-3425637/; see also, e.g., DigitalEurope Comments on the Risk-Based 
Approach, DIGITALEUROPE 6–10 (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.digitaleurope.org/Document 
Download.aspx?Command=Core_Download&EntryId=601.  See generally Big Data: A New 
World of Opportunities, NESSI (Dec. 2012), http://www.nessi-europe.com/Files/Private/ 
NESSI_WhitePaper_BigData.pdf (addressing the benefits of big data and how legal rules 
should be set accordingly). 
  13   See Jonathan Shaw, Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal: Information Science Promises to 
Change the World, HARV. MAG. (Mar.-Apr. 2014), http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/ 
why-big-data-is-a-big-deal; Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html; 
Svetlana Sicular, Gartner’s Big Data Definition Consists of Three Parts, Not to Be Confused 
with Three “V”s, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2013 
/03/27/gartners-big-data-definition-consists-of-three-parts-not-to-be-confused-with-three-
vs/#39afa0e13bf6l.  See also Big Data, GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-
data/ (last visited May 15, 2017) (defining “Big Data”); Chris Forsyth, For Big Data Analytics 
There’s No Such Thing as Too Big: The Compelling Economics and Technology of Big Data 
Computing, 4SYTHCOMM.COM (Mar. 2012), http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/data 
centervirtualization/big_data_wp.pdf?utm_source=datafloq&utm_medium=ref&utm_campa
ign=datafloq. 
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Variety of sources, the Velocity with which the analysis of the data can 
unfold, and the Veracity of the data which could (arguably) be achieved 
through the analytical process.14 
To facilitate the discussion this Article sets forth, the term “Big Data” 
would be broadly applied15 to address a fundamental change in the way data 
is collected, stored, and subsequently used—all a result of recent 
technological developments.  In today’s digital age, data is collected using 
multiple sensors as well as through various applications which record user’s 
movements, communications and transactions.16  It is stored using 
sophisticated mechanisms on distributed databases, the cost of which is 
constantly shrinking.  Finally, it is used in advanced analytical processes and 
thereafter applied in a variety of contexts.17 
Furthermore, Big Data often refers to specific advanced forms of data 
analyses, at times even machine-driven18 and powered by data mining 
tools.19  These automated processes, which are the focus of this Article’s 
discussion, seek out correlations and clusters within the vast datasets, with 
analysts merely setting overall parameters and sifting through the results to 
set aside obvious errors.20  Indeed, data-driven (as opposed to query-driven 
or human-driven) processes enable analysts to utilize the huge databases at 
their disposal, especially in instances in which the analysts actually do not 
know where to start looking. 
While Big Data analyses which are driven by automated processes 
 
  14   Sicular, supra note 13.  Some literary sources even add a fifth “V” – that of “Value,” 
yet this factor seems rather speculative and is thus best omitted.  Bernard Marr, Why only one 
of the 5 Vs of big data really matters, IBM BIG DATA & ANALYTICS HUB (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/blog/why-only-one-5-vs-big-data-really-matters.  
  15   For a similar working definition, see Mireille Hildebrandt, Location Data, Purpose 
Binding and Contextual Integrity: What’s the Message?, in PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AND 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY – A NEW EQUILIBRIUM? (Luciano Floridi ed., 2014), 
https://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/54/ (using the term “Big Data Space”). 
 16  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSP. 22 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-
_may_2014.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT].  
  17   See Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-Based 
Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the Internet 
Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13 (2004) [hereinafter Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions], for a 
discussion of these steps. 
  18   See Big Data, GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data/ (last visited 
May 15, 2017) (defining “Big Data” to include the enablement of “process automation”). 
  19   See generally Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the 
Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”]; WHITE HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 16, at 24. 
 20  Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1504, 1517 (2013) 
[hereinafter Zarsky, Transparent Predictions]. 
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introduce a wide variety of practices, this Article further focuses its scope on 
those which feature two specific attributes.  First, it focuses on processes 
which rely on and produce, respectively, data and information of personal 
nature.  Indeed, Big Data analysis might feature vast datasets related to 
astronomical sightings, chemical compounds, geological measurements and 
other similar sources that do not involve specific individuals, yet their 
analysis might, at one point, advance their lives.  These initiatives are not 
part of the current inquiry.  Yet many other sources are of personal nature, 
and their analysis does generate data protection concerns.21  These involve, 
for instance, datasets related to individualized consumption, 
communications, and actions.  Note, however, that the advanced analytical 
abilities here discussed render additional spheres of data to be potentially 
“personal,” such as demographic and statistical data pertaining to larger 
groups which can now be possibly attributed to specific persons.22  These 
latter processes are therefore rendered relevant to the current discussion as 
well. 
Second, this Article addresses instances in which the results of the Big 
Data analyses are applied to specific individuals and thus affect them 
directly.  Again, this often is not the case.  The outputs of Big Data 
processes—even those pertaining to personal data—are often merely 
statistical findings related to aggregated data which are applied broadly by 
the relevant firm.  Yet, in other instances, the results of Big Data analysis are 
indeed used in a unique interaction with a specific individual—either directly 
or indirectly.  Among others, this aspect of the data flow is enabled by the 
emergence of personalized digital interfaces which allow for the tailoring of 
interactions with users on the basis of previously collected data, even in real 
time.23  While these two latter aspects of Big Data pertain to a mere sliver of 
the overall realm of big data uses, they potentially generate both the most 
difficult policy questions and risks on the one hand, and the greatest social 
benefits and advances on the other.  Therefore, they are worthy of this 
specific inquiry. 
As noted, business gurus sing the praise of big data analysis, explaining 
how it not only generates efficiency and promotes welfare, but also provides 
society with rich knowledge which could better our lives in a variety of 
contexts.24  However, as the fascination with Big Data and its prospect grew, 
 
  21   van der Sloot & van Schendel, supra note 5, ¶ 113 (referring also to statements made 
by the EDPS). 
  22   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(1), at 33 (broadly defining “personal data” to include 
instances in which a specific individual is identifiable).  See also id., rec. 26; Ira Rubinstein 
& Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. 703, 710–11 (2016) 
(regarding the risk of re-identification).  
  23   For more on this data cycle, see Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions, supra note 17. 
  24   For a summary of publications and reports making this point, see Omer Tene & Jules 
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skepticism quickly followed.  Critics often claim that the term “Big Data” 
consists of mostly hype.  Therefore, stories of its success must be taken (at 
least) with a grain of salt.25  If that is indeed true, one might claim that the 
in-depth analytical discussion to follow is unnecessary.  But as now follows, 
the analytical discussion this Article addresses is nonetheless crucial. 
The “hype” critique of Big Data features two distinct aspects.  First, 
one can certainly argue that the “Big Data Revolution”26 is at best a mere 
evolution.  It relates to a long list of practices, benefits, and problems which 
were continuously unfolding for some time, and at one distinct point 
captured the media’s—and thereafter the public’s—interest.27  Given this 
gradual change, this argument might state there is no real technological 
revolution which requires the urgent recalibration of policy objectives and 
legal rules. 
At its core, this critique has much truth to it.  Thus far, however, it has 
limited relevance to any policy debate.  “Big Data” is currently generating 
great interest, leading many firms to accelerate their adaptation to the new 
data environment.  Therefore, even if the process is merely evolutionary by 
nature, law and policy can no longer ignore the incremental changes that 
have brought about this new digital era.  Rather, they must provide responses 
to this change—be it a “revolution,” or a mere “evolution.” 
A second, harsher critique argues that Big Data refers to a promise that 
cannot be fulfilled.28  One might argue that these processes provide vast 
benefits in theory.  Yet in practice they are costly (both in actual costs and 
 
Polontesky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 243–51 (2013). 
 25  See Steve Dodson, Big Data, Big Hype?, WIRED (Apr. 2014), https://www.wired.com 
/insights/2014/04/big-data-big-hype/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2017), for a review of these 
arguments.  See also Moerel & Prins, supra note 9, at 14.  
  26   For a prominent reference to this term, see ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG 
DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2014).  In the 
consulting context, see Peter Groves, Basel Kayyali, David Knott & Steve Van Kuiken, The 
‘Big Data’ Revolution in Healthcare, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 2013), http://www.mckinsey. 
com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/healthcare%20systems%20and%20services/our%20insig
hts/the%20big%20data%20revolution%20in%20us%20health%20care/the_big_data_revolut
ion_in_healthcare.ashx. 
  27   For a discussion of this argument in the press, see Jason Hiner, Dan Kusnetzky & 
Andrew Brust, Big Data: Revolution or evolution?, ZDNET (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/big-data-revolution-or-evolution/; Samuel Arbesman, Five 
myths about big data, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/five-myths-about-big-data/2013/08/15/64a0dd0a-e044-11e2-963a-
72d740e88c12_story.html.  
  28   See Bennett & Bayley, supra note 11, at 206.  See also Svetlana Sicular, Big Data is 
Falling into the Trough of Disillusionment, GARTNER (Jan. 22, 2013), http://blogs.gartner. 
com/svetlana-sicular/big-data-is-falling-into-the-trough-of-disillusionment/; Paul Ohm, 
Response, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 339 (2013), 
https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-339.pdf. 
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other damages to data subjects and their rights) and their results flawed.29  
The data used is often inaccurate and its transformation to different contexts 
leads to problematic outcomes.  But here, too, this argument cannot lead to 
rejecting the analysis to follow.  Indeed, the benefits of Big Data are often 
exaggerated.30  This Article will accept as given the fact that such analyses 
can generate substantial social benefits, if exercised with sufficient caution.  
This assumption is not farfetched, and is already reflected in central policy 
documents, such as those released by the White House in 2014.31  It is, 
though, conceded that actual Big Data practices are in their infancy and will 
take years to assess.32 
Big Data analysis of personal information is therefore a substantial 
dynamic and here to stay.  It is also quite clear that it both affects and is 
affected by the extent of data protection policy.  On the one hand, these 
advanced forms of data analyses can compromise the individuals’ privacy 
rights and the control citizens have over their personal data.  Thus, the 
availability of these tools might require stricter enforcement of privacy laws 
to so limit privacy-related harms.33  On the other hand, stringent data 
protection laws impede the flow of personal data, as well as the ways it could 
be analyzed and used.  In other words, stricter data protection and privacy 
laws compromise the growth of the Big Data industry and the benefits to be 
derived from it. 
The noted double-sided tension between data analytics and data 
protection has not escaped the GDPR’s framers.  Quite to the contrary, such 
tension is already evident in the GDPR’s title.  The GDPR is a regulation 
“on the protection of natural persons,” and thus would surely strive to limit 
the risks big data analysis might generate.  Conversely, the title also indicates 
such regulation is “with regard to . . . the free movement of such data” and 
therefore must also facilitate the analysis of data, to the benefit of society.34  
Indeed, the GDPR’s framers were called to balance between the ability to 
engage in big data analysis to its fullest extent and the protection of privacy 
interests and rights.  It is the precise nature of this balance and its flaws that 
 
 29  Harvey Schachter, Unearthing Big Myths about Big Data, THE GLOBE & MAIL (May 
3, 2015), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/careers/management/ 
unearthing-big-myths-about-big-data/article24176687/. 
  30   Bennet & Bayley, supra note 11, at 206. 
 31  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING 
VALUES 48–58 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_ 
data_privacy_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf. 
  32   van der Sloot & van Schendel, supra note 5, at 22–25, 37 (indicating that very few Big 
Data initiatives have already been launched, yet many are planned for the near future; at this 
time, however, the extent of opportunities is unclear). 
  33   See id. at 7–8; see generally Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”, supra note 19. 
  34   GDPR, supra note 1, at 1. 
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this Article will now explore. 
The acknowledgement of the existence of this apparent tension is not 
shared by all.  One might argue against the existence of such tension, while 
asserting that appropriate data protection regulation in fact promotes the 
extent of data analysis and the benefits derived from it.  This is, in fact, the 
EU’s official position as reflected in some of its policy documents.  For 
instance, in a “Fact Sheet” addressing this specific matter, the European 
Commission explains that the new regulation can enhance big data analysis, 
as it would promote “trust” and thus lead to greater engagement with these 
platforms, more data and greater benefits.35  A similar notion was set forth 
in an Article 29 Working Party opinion addressing the growing use of Big 
Data.36  These opinions echo similar statements made by EU leaders in the 
past regarding the advantages and benefits of data protection law in 
general.37 
The argument linking greater data protection and enhanced Big Data 
abilities is flawed, and most likely merely represents wishful thinking.  For 
the most part, users thus far have failed to demonstrate in their actual 
practices and behavior (as opposed, perhaps, to their mere responses to 
surveys and questionnaires) that they sufficiently care as to whether trust is 
or is not maintained.  Therefore, there is no reason to believe that firms will 
strive to promote and achieve such trust in the ways they design or operate 
their data-rich businesses.38  This conclusion leads to the clear understanding 
that enhanced data protection in fact potentially undermines the abilities to 
engage in Big Data in general, and that rules adopted in the GDPR enhance 
these problems on various fronts in particular, as the next chapter 
 
 35  Rouvroy, supra note 10, at 1. 
  36   See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, STATEMENT ON STATEMENT OF 
THE WP29 ON THE IMPACT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIG DATA ON THE PROTECTION OF 
INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF THEIR PERSONAL DATA IN THE EU, at 2 
(2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-reco 
mmendation/files/2014/wp221_en.pdf.  
 37  For an extensive discussion of this point, see Zarsky, The Privacy–Innovation 
Conundrum, supra note 7, at 130.  See also Viviane Reding, The European Data Protection 
Framework for the Twenty-First Century, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 119, 129 (2012).  See 
also statements by various EU regulators as noted in van der Sloot & van Schendel, supra 
note 5, at 52.  
 38  Zarsky, The Privacy–Innovation Conundrum, supra note 7 (including references 
therein).  But see Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 
YALE L.J. 1180 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899760; Courtney Bowman & John Grant, 
A Marketplace for Privacy: Incentives for Privacy Engineering and Innovation, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK FOR CONSUMER PRIVACY (Evan Selinger et al. eds., forthcoming 
2017) (draft on file with author) (stating that firms might strive to provide consumer trust 
given their interest to attract talented employees who might demand that the firm adhere to 
high moral and ethical standards; the strength of this intriguing argument is yet to be seen but 
should certainly be tracked and studied). 
ZARSKY_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2017  7:37 PM 
1004 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:995 
demonstrates. 
III. THE GDPR’S INCOMPATIBILITY – FOUR EXAMPLES 
As explained, data protection regulation, in its essence, is in tension 
with Big Data practices.  This Part will further demonstrate that the balance 
set forth in the GDPR is unacceptable and suboptimal; in some instances the 
Regulation will undermine the ability to exercise big data analysis.  In others, 
the availability of Big Data technologies undermines some of the measures 
and distinctions the GDPR features.39  This assertion will be demonstrated 
by referring to the key provisions of purpose limitation, data minimization, 
special categories, and automated decisions. 
As demonstrated below, all the noted provisions are reiterations of legal 
concepts stated in the Data Protection Directive and elsewhere in European 
law.  Nonetheless, addressing these issues at this juncture (just before the 
GDPR comes into force), and in concert, is essential.  Furthermore, merely 
stating that these matters were already legislated, regulated, discussed, and 
therefore, accepted is an insufficient response.  The fact that these concepts 
were repeated in the GDPR (with adding some important changes) is of great 
significance which requires a renewed examination of these concepts.40 
When the EU Data Protection Directive (DPD) passed, much of what 
we are now discussing was the stuff of science fiction.  Given the fact that 
the legislator’s intention as to how we must deal with today’s novel 
challenges was unclear, one might argue that the rules based on the DPD 
should be somewhat bent and circumvented.  However, and as noted,41 the 
negotiations surrounding the GDPR’s enactment were carried out in an 
environment in which the feasibility and benefits of Big Data analytics were 
acknowledged.  It is therefore fair to state that the EU community has 
provided a clear sign of approval to the noted policy ideas by reintroducing 
these concepts into the law in the Big Data Age: a sign that would here be 
questioned. 
 
  39   An additional context in which Big Data technology might further undermine 
distinctions set out in the GDPR is the technology’s ability to undermine the distinction 
between identifiable and non-identifiable data.  Given the wealth of recent academic and 
regulatory research regarding this matter, this Article sets this matter aside.  For a discussion 
of this element, see Bennett & Bayley, supra note 11, at 210.  For more on this matter, see 
generally Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 22; Rubinstein, supra note 8, at 78.  Yet another 
issue this Article sets aside and does not address is the way in which Big Data undermines the 
ability to obtain meaningful and informed consent for subsequent data usage.  For more on 
this argument, see id. at 78.  This issue is set aside as the notion of consent raises vast problems 
and questions generally, and therefore arguing that the emergence of Big Data at this point 
undermines this already shaky notion is quite difficult. 
40 Rubinstein, supra note 8, at 74 (noting that the “Big Data tsunami” will “overwhelm” the 
EU’s reform efforts). 
  41   See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, while one can debate whether the GDPR provides rules 
substantially different than those already existing in the DPD, it is quite clear 
it provides key jurisdictional and procedural innovations which are bound to 
make a substantive difference.  The GDPR now clearly pertains to a far 
broader scope of entities engaging in Big Data analysis of information 
pertaining to EU residents.  Therefore, the analysis of the Regulation is of 
greater importance as it will impact far more entities on an international 
level.42  In addition, the rules set in the GDPR must be reevaluated as they 
will be taken far more seriously than those set out in the DPD, given the 
noticeable fines which can follow from non-compliance.43  Thus, if until now 
some firms might have been willing to take the calculated risks of ignoring 
data protection compliance requirements, the GDPR will be sure to capture 
these firms’ attention and force them to adopt relevant changes.  Such 
changes would be substantial because firms will be more inclined to opt for 
erring on the side of caution given the extensive fines. 
In what follows, this Part will address every one of the four provisions 
noted, their meaning and their origin, explain how they are linked to Big 
Data analyses, the problems the GDPR will create as well as possible 
mitigating factors, loopholes, and work-arounds already existing in the law.  
Every segment will nonetheless conclude that the current GDPR provisions 
lead to problematic outcomes given the prospect of Big Data analytics. 
A. Purpose Limitation 
Article 5(1)(b) of the GDPR sets forth the fundamental notion that 
personal data must be collected for a “specific, explicit and legitimate” 
purpose and cannot be further “processed” (a term broadly defined)44 in a 
way which is “incompatible” with such original purposes.45 
As many commentators and reports point out, purpose specification is 
clearly at odds with the prospect of Big Data analyses.46  Quite often 
 
  42   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 3.  See also Christopher Kuner, The Internet and the Global 
Reach of EU Law, in THE COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 25 
(forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2890930.  
  43   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83. 
  44   See id. art. 4(2). 
  45   See id. art. 5(1)(b). 
  46   See, e.g., Mireille Hildebrandt, Slaves to Big Data. Or Are We?, IDP. REVISTA DE 
INTERNET, DERECHO Y POLÍTICA? 16, 17 (2013), http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hilde 
brandt/52; Moerel & Prins, supra note 9, at 7.  See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING 
PARTY, supra note 36, at 2.  See also Rouvroy, supra note 10, at 25 (noting that purpose 
specification is “inimical to the whole philosophy of Big Data”).  This notion was even stated 
by the Article 29 Working Party itself (even though it was ultimately rejected).  See also van 
der Sloot & van Schendel, supra note 5, at 38–39; Big data, artificial intelligence, machine 
learning and data protection, UK INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFF. 37–39 (2017), 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-
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analyzing Big Data involves methods and usage patterns which neither the 
entity collecting the data nor the data subject considered or even imagined at 
the time of collection.  To comply with the purpose specification rule, entities 
striving to engage in Big Data analysis will need to inform their data subjects 
of the future forms of processing they will engage in (which must still be 
legitimate by nature) and closely monitor their practices to assure they did 
not exceed the permitted realm of analyses.  Carrying out any one of these 
tasks might prove costly, difficult and even impossible.  Alternatively, those 
engaged in Big Data analysis must strive to tailor their practices to fall within 
the noted exceptions to this rule, as addressed below.  Trying to circumvent 
this limitation by initially defining a very broad and vague purpose for future 
uses would most likely not resolve this matter, as the stated purposes must 
also be “specific.”47  Furthermore, stating an unnecessarily broad purpose 
might even be considered as “illegitimate” and thus lead to unacceptable 
processing.48 
Purpose limitation is one of the cornerstones of the EU’s data protection 
regime.  It was featured in the DPD.49  Yet more importantly, this concept is 
clearly noted in article 8(2) of the European Charter.50  Given purpose 
limitation’s enshrinement within the EU’s primary legal source, the GDPR’s 
drafters had no choice but to incorporate it in full within the Regulation.  Any 
step short of that would have risked the invalidation of the GDPR by the 
European Court of Justice.51 
Beyond tradition and the constitutional mandate, there are several 
substantial justifications for upholding and embracing the purpose limitation 
principle, even in the age of Big Data.52  On a theoretical level, assuring that 
data controllers respect the purpose limitation principle will allow data 
subjects to exercise at least some control over their personal information—
control being a central justification for EU data protection.53  Additional 
 
protection.pdf [hereinafter UK ICO Report]. 
 47  ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 03/2013 ON PURPOSE 
LIMITATION (WP 203), at 17, 52 (Apr. 2, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf.  
 48  See, e.g., Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Yann Padova, Regime Change? Enabling Big 
Data through Europe’s New Data Protection Regulation, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
315, 326 (2016), http://stlr.org/download/volumes/volume17/SchonbergerPadova.pdf.  
  49   DPD, supra note 4, art. 6(1)(b). 
  50   Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8(2), 2012 O.J. C 326/391 
[hereinafter Charter of Rights]. 
  51   For a similar outcome in a related context, see Digital Rights Ireland v. Comm’n, 
Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
  52   Hildebrandt finds that purpose specification is closely linked to the central notion of 
legality and even that of the “rule of law.”  See Hildebrandt, supra note 15, at 23. 
  53   The notion of control is further linked to fundamental principles such as individual 
autonomy and self-fulfillment.  See discussion in Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, supra note 
20, at 1541–42. 
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instrumental justifications, recently stated by the Article 29 Working Party, 
are that abiding by this principle promotes trust in data environments,54 as 
well as competition.  This latter argument further states that purpose-
specification rules weaken the hold monopolies have in data markets, while 
allowing start-ups to enter and compete. 
These justifications are not beyond debate.  Responding on the 
theoretical level, one might argue that in the digital age, users have 
objectively surrendered much of their control over personal data.  The state’s 
active intervention in providing individuals with rights they did not 
necessarily demand might amount to paternalism and undermine autonomy, 
and the nature of this basic right must therefore be questioned.55 
On the instrumental level, it is possible to promote trust and limit 
abuses by closely monitoring data uses, rather than blocking ex ante 
analyses.56  In addition, one might seriously question to what extent purpose 
limitation can indeed promote competition.  Quite to the contrary, it might 
act as an inhibitor of competition, as it limits the abilities of start-ups to 
gather information on secondary markets and use it to enter new realms of 
business.57  Instead, abiding by the “purpose specification” principle assures 
that only the monopolies that already have access to clients and their data 
can remain active in data rich markets, as these entities can eventually 
receive proper authorization from the data subjects to proceed with the data 
analysis.  Given these counter-arguments, we must move forward and 
reconsider the validity of this key principle in the Big Data age. 
Returning to the doctrinal analysis, it must be noted that the purpose 
limitation principle, as stated in the GDPR, includes a specific feature which, 
in theory at least, might enable Big Data analysis nonetheless to thrive: the 
notion of compatibility.  If subsequent processing goes beyond the originally 
specified purpose yet is nonetheless compatible with it, such processing is 
permitted.  However, even after accounting for the non-trivial maneuvering 
space this element provides, one can confidently assert that the GDPR 
substantially hampers Big Data initiatives. 
The key provisions to understanding the notion of “compatibility” in 
this context are articles 5(1)(b) and 6(4) of the GDPR.  Article 5(1)(b) states 
that  processing for “statistical purposes” would not be considered 
incompatible.  Therefore, if Big Data analytics will fall within this category, 
 
  54   Hildebrandt explains that putting a brake on the re-usage of personal data, while also 
limiting its collection, is one way of preventing the datafication of everything and the threats 
it entails.  See MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW: 
NOVEL ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 205 (2015). 
  55   For a somewhat more detailed discussion of this argument, see Zarsky, Transparent 
Predictions, supra note 20, at 1541–45.  
  56   Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions, supra note 17, at 33. 
  57   See discussion in Zarsky, The Privacy–Innovation Conundrum, supra note 7, at 136. 
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they could proceed.  The extent of this exception is further detailed in article 
89(1),58 which states that “appropriate safeguards” must, nonetheless, be 
applied.  Such safeguards, which must assure data minimization and might 
apply forms of pseudonymization, are not defined by the Regulation, yet 
might be set by the relevant Member States at a later time.59 
The greatest challenge to relying on the “statistical purposes” exception 
to execute and enable the Big Data processes is noted at the very end of 
recital 162.  This recital provides additional explanatory language regarding 
the meaning of this exception.60  Here, the recital notes that the term 
“statistical purposes” implies that the results of such processing are not used 
“in support of measures of decisions regarding any particular natural 
person.”  Yet the Big Data practices which this Article chooses to address 
are specifically those that directly impact individuals, as they are used to 
provide them with unique and specific treatment.  On its face, such uses are 
only permitted when meeting the strict purpose specification rule as detailed 
above—a difficult task in the Big Data environment.61 
Beyond the “statistical process” exception, article 6(4) explains how 
compatibility could be established while applying various safeguards.62  The 
listed criteria are an extension of the exceptions available under the DPD,63 
but are nonetheless somewhat abstract and of great difficulty to establish in 
the Big Data context.  For instance, article 6(4)(b) calls for considering the 
context in which the data was collected—a notion counter to that of Big Data, 
which calls for analyzing data in different and distant contexts.64  Article 
6(4)(c) calls for considering the “nature of the personal data”—yet another 
factor that is constantly in flux when applying Big Data measures.65  Finally, 
article 6(4)(e) calls for the use of possible safeguards such as 
pseydonymization—a measure which can substantially undermine the 
quality of the data and the insights it can provide given the loss of identifiable 
data which adds to the process’s precision and accuracy.66 
In conclusion, the “purpose specification” requirement clearly clashes 
 
  58   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 89(1). 
  59   Id. art. 89(2). 
 60  Id. art. 162. 
  61   For a similar analysis, see Rouvroy, supra note 10, at 26 (analyzing the provisions of 
Convention 108 and the “statistical processes” exception it features, which also includes 
similar reservations which limit instances which pose harm to a data subject).  But see Mayer-
Schönberger & Padova, supra note 48, at 329, for an opposing view, finding that the 
“statistical” exception could enable Big Data analysis. 
  62   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 6(4). 
  63   Moerel & Prins, supra note 9, at 52–54.  
  64   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 6(4)(b). 
 65  Id. art. 6(4)(c). 
 66  Id. art. 6(4)(e). 
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with the prospect of Big Data analysis.  It appears that the GDPR’s drafters 
have taken some measures to ease this tension, yet the current outcome is 
still insufficient and generates uncertainty.  Furthermore, the safeguards 
offered are complex, difficult to execute, and might undermine the utility of 
the entire process.  However, it is possible that member states would be able 
to take steps to indeed mitigate this concern to the extent possible given the 
EU Charter.67  The UK’s ICO Report has indicated, for instance, that a 
“fairness”-based test as to subsequent uses should be applied (while 
considering the data subject’s expectations); unfortunately, this option might 
generate substantial uncertainty as well.68  Another option would be applying 
this principle and the limitation it poses narrowly.  This is advisable, as the 
analytical justifications for upholding this principle are shaky, at best.69 
B. Data Minimization 
The “Data Minimization” principle is yet another cornerstone of EU 
data protection policy.  Unlike “Purpose Specification,” this principle is not 
explicitly noted in the EU Charter, an omission which provides European 
legislators and regulators with greater flexibility when defining its outer 
limits.70  The right is articulated in article 5(1)(c) stating that data must be 
“limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are 
processed.”71  This principle appears at several other junctures throughout 
the Regulation, most notably in article 25, where it is stated as a requirement 
when designing relevant systems.72  The minimization principle pertains to 
several dimensions: it relates to the scope and categories of data initially 
collected.  In addition, it also refers to the limited duration during which 
personal data may be retained and the requirement that such data be deleted 
after its intended use.73 
The justifications for data minimization are both intuitive and 
instrumental.  When the minimization principle is followed, data controllers 
have fewer opportunities to undermine the data protection rights of data 
 
  67   Mayer-Schönberger & Padova, supra note 48, at 329.  
  68   UK ICO Report, supra note 46, at 37–39.  
  69   Note, for instance, that a report published by the Norwegian Data Protection Authority 
noted the clash and recommends that the notion of purpose limitation rules be applied 
narrowly.  See DATATILSYNET, supra note 8, at 47. 
  70   See Charter of Rights, supra note 50, 2012 O.J. C 326/391.  
  71   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(C).  
  72   Id. art. 25(1).  
  73   For a clear statement linking data minimization to the limited duration of storage, see 
id., rec. 39 (explaining this principle requires “ensuring that the period for which the personal 
data are stored is limited to a strict minimum,” and that “time limits should be established by 
the controller”).  For a demonstration of the importance of this principle in the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence, see Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources, Case C-293/12, [2014] E.C.R. 238.  
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subjects.  Indeed, with less data, data controllers will be unable to go beyond 
consented usage or violate their users’ privacy in other ways.  An additional 
justification can relate to the realm of cyber-security.  The longer a data 
controller holds personal information (especially in large quantities), the 
greater the risk that such data would be hacked by both internal and external 
entities.  The fact that data controllers do not have sufficient incentives to 
apply optimal cyber-security measures most likely enhances this risk of data 
leakage.  Data minimization requirements can minimize this risk.  In 
addition, on a theoretical level, the mere holding of personal data by the 
controller may undermine the data subject’s autonomy and generate 
anxiety.74  Data minimization lessens these concerns as well.  Note that an 
overall response to these concerns could state that ex post-based regulations 
could protect data subjects from harmful uses and insufficient protection, 
punishing data controllers for unacceptable actions and omissions after the 
fact. 
Data minimization requirements were prominently featured in the DPD 
as well.75  However, the GDPR’s enactment has somewhat expanded the 
reach of this principle.76  The DPD noted that personal data must not be 
“excessive in relation to the purposes” collected or further processed.77  The 
GDPR states that personal data should be “limited to what is necessary.”78  
Clearly the language currently used calls upon data controllers to apply even 
greater scrutiny to their data practices and minimize the data at their 
disposal.79 
The clash between the data minimization principle and the practices of 
Big Data analysis is intuitive, and was noted by several commentators as 
well.80  The rush towards Big Data provides firms with a clear incentive to 
 
  74   For more on these specific concerns from the U.S. perspective, see generally Daniel J. 
Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001). 
  75   DPD, supra note 4, art. 6(1)(c).  
  76   Detlev Gabel & Tim Hickman, Data Protection Principles - Unlocking the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation, WHITE & CASE (July 22, 2016), http://www.whitecase 
.com/publications/article/chapter-6-data-protection-principles-unlocking-eu-general-data-
protection. 
  77   DPD, supra note 4, art. 6(1)(c).  This provision features an additional requirement that 
personal data be adequate and relevant, which has not changed in the GDPR. 
  78   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(c). 
  79   But see Joris van Hoboken, From Collection to Use in Privacy Regulation? A 
Forward-Looking Comparison of European and US Frameworks for Personal Data 
Processing, in EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF BIG DATA 231, 238 (Bart van der Sloot et al. 
eds., 2016) (stating that whether this change will strengthen privacy protection is up to the 
future interpretation of this concept).  
  80   Bennet & Bayley, supra note 11, at 210 (“The business model of Big Data is 
antithetical to these Principles [of data minimization][.]”); Rouvroy, supra note 10, at 14.  See 
also van der Sloot & van Schendel, supra note 5, at 38–39; DATATILSYNET, supra note 8, at 
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collect and retain as much data as they can for as long as possible (while 
accounting for the non-trivial costs of data collection and analysis).  The 
ongoing improvements in data science and related fields might generate the 
belief that tomorrow holds great promise in what we might find while 
analyzing existing data, and therefore we certainly must not dispose of the 
data we hold today.  In theory, at least, with more data will come greater 
knowledge and thus greater benefit to the firms and potentially society in 
general.  On the other hand, diligently enforcing the “data minimization” 
principle will limit the success of “Big Data” initiatives while undermining 
their utility, with perhaps only limited justification. 
Here as well the GDPR offers exceptions and potential loopholes, 
which might enable some limited yet insufficient Big Data analysis.  In 
situations which meet the definition of a “statistical purpose,”81 the GDPR 
concedes that data minimization could be achieved by pseudonymization; 
applying technological and statistical safeguards which will not allow for the 
identification of the data subjects.  Yet as explained above,82 this exception 
does not apply to many of the Big Data analyses addressed in this Article, 
given Big Data’s subsequent effects on specific individuals.  In addition, 
removing identifiers to achieve pseudonymity can potentially undermine the 
quality of the results derived, as the data would be purposefully altered and 
the aggregation of different datasets would be rendered difficult.83  All these 
measures can subsequently limit the utility and benefits of the Big Data 
analyses. 
To conclude, in the age of Big Data, the GDPR’s data minimization 
requirements should be reconsidered, and perhaps somewhat loosened, as 
they undermine the success of potential Big Data initiatives.  While the 
privacy and security concerns noted are substantial, they could probably be 
resolved through ex post regulation, which regulates unacceptable uses and 
abuses while still enabling the rich data analysis here discussed.84  Thus the 
justifications for maintaining the strict data minimization rule are somewhat 
undermined.  In the view of all the above, the logic of applying even stricter 
rules in the GDPR must be questioned. 
 
 
42; Rubinstein, supra note 8, at 78 (predicting this requirement will often be breached). 
  81   See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 89(1), rec. 156. 
  82   See supra Section III(1), notes 58–61 and accompanying text.  
  83   Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010).  
  84   For a similar argument, see Rouvroy, supra note 10, at 17.  The GDPR indeed provides 
enhanced measures to promote data security.  GDPR, supra note 1, arts. 32–34.   
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C. Special Categories 
A cornerstone of EU data protection policy is the creation of a layered 
regime, in which some forms of data categories and datasets are treated 
differently from others.  In the DPD, article 8(1) prohibited the processing 
of data “revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data 
concerning health or sex life,” while providing narrow exceptions.85  This 
distinction was embraced by the GDPR.  The GDPR’s article 9 prohibits the 
processing of similar “special categories,” while adding genetic data, 
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, and 
data related to sexual orientation to the list of special categories.86 
Processing of such information is still possible, subject to “explicit” 
consent or situations in which specific exceptions apply.87  The former 
requirement itself might not substantially set the “special categories” apart 
from other forms of information, as obtaining consent for Big Data analysis 
is a challenging task in any event (i.e. even for data which is private, yet does 
not belong to a special category).88  In addition, the GDPR provides a long 
list of general and specific “necessity”-based exceptions which allow, at 
times, for the processing of such sensitive data (especially in the health-
related context).89  Additional provisions permit Member States to set 
additional rules delineating specific exceptions.90 
Again, the justification for setting this higher level of protection for 
special categories is intuitive.  The categories noted constitute those which 
almost all individuals consider the most private.91  The spreading or leaking 
of data from within these categories is bound to cause individuals the most 
distress, and can potentially generate the greatest harms.92  Given these 
concerns, the GDPR took additional steps to enhance the protection of 
several categories by expanding their definitions, most notably in the context 
of “health.”  Here, recital 35 states that “health data” should include various 
factors such as “disease risk” and “medical history.”  An Article 29 Working 
 
  85   DPD, supra note 4, art. 8(1). 
  86   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(13–15) (providing elaborate definitions to the terms 
“genetic data,” “biometric data,” and “data concerning health,” respectively).   
  87   Id. art. 9(2)(A). 
  88   Obtaining “consent” is one way for enabling lawful processing in general.  See GDPR, 
supra note 1, art. 6(1)(a).  Under the GDPR, “consent” is strictly defined in article 4(11) to 
require freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous indication.  It is unclear how this 
might prove different from the requirement for “explicit” consent noted in article 9.  For a 
similar position, see Moerel & Prins, supra note 9, at 57.  
  89   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 9(2)(b–j), rec. 54.  
  90   Id. art. 9(4).  
  91   See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1169 (2015).  
  92   Id. at 1131 (“[S]ensitive information can lead to significant forms of harm.”).   
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Party opinion addressing this matter found that the proceeds of novel forms 
of data collection (through the use of Internet of Things applications) and 
data analysis, which reveal health-related information, fall within this special 
category as well and should receive greater protection.93 
Enter Big Data.  These new forms of enhanced analytics challenge the 
ability to draw a distinction between “special” and other categories.  Namely, 
an analysis merely relying on and addressing “regular” categories can quite 
quickly end up pertaining to “special categories.”94  For instance, health data 
can be deduced from a variety of datasets, such as shopping databases, and 
therefore this category has quickly and sharply expanded.95  Thus, over time 
and given Big Data analysis, “special categories” mushroom in size.  It was 
said in a different context that “we feel that all data is credit data, we just 
don’t know how to use it yet.”96  The same statement could probably be made 
regarding almost all the other special categories noted.  Therefore, the need 
to distinguish between the processing of “regular” and “special” categories 
encumbers Big Data processes that might inadvertently shift from one 
category to another, every one of which requires the application of a different 
set of legal rules. 
Beyond encumbering the process, Big Data potentially undermines the 
entire distinction between these categories.97  If nearly all forms of data 
categories and data sets can produce special data, why even bother with this 
distinction, which is rendered almost artificial?  Note that, unlike the analysis 
in other segments of this Article, here the GDPR is not only impeding upon 
the ability to carry out big data analyses, but the availability of such analyses 
is undermining the most basic distinctions the GDPR sets forth. 
The enhanced protection of specific categories could nonetheless be 
justified in the Big Data age, even if drawing out the actual distinctions 
proves impossible.  Such protection, arguably, has symbolic value; through 
 
 93  ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, ANNEX – HEALTH DATA IN APPS AND 
DEVICES, at 1 (Feb. 5, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/other document/files/2015/20150205_letter_art29wp_ec_health 
_data_after_plenary_annex_en.pdf.  
  94   See Ohm, supra note 91, at 1170; Lokke Moerel, GDPR conundrums: Processing 
special categories of data, IAPP (Sept. 12, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-conundrums-
processing-special-categories-of-data/. 
  95   Rouvroy, supra note 10, at 27.  
  96   This was famously noted by Dr. Douglas Merrill, former Google CTO, who went on 
to found ZestFinance.  Quentin Hardy, Just the Facts. Yes, All of Them, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/business/factuals-gil-elbaz-wants-to-gather-the-
data-universe.html.  
 97  For a similar argument, see Moerel & Prins, supra 9, at 57.  Even without referring to 
Big Data, some have argued that rather than examining sensitive categories, we must focus 
on sensitive contexts.  Given the limitations of this specific project, this broader critique is 
not discussed in this Article.  See Ohm, supra note 91, at 1145.  
ZARSKY_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2017  7:37 PM 
1014 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:995 
these rules, the law provides a clear signal that specific forms of data can 
generate substantial harm and therefore must be treated with greater care.  
On the other hand, the age of Big Data might be further undermining the 
justifications for introducing these distinctions, even on the symbolic level.  
According to Antoinette Rouvroy, there is a substantial difference between 
previous forms of discrimination along the lines of sensitive factors, and 
those unfolding in the Big Data age.98  In this new era, newer forms of 
discrimination do not necessarily result from discriminatory intent, which 
the singling out of special categories aims to protect both actually and 
symbolically.99  Rather, discrimination carried out today is data driven, often 
does not involve intent, and is not split along the simple clear lines of the 
noted special categories.100 
In addition, the practice of establishing discriminatory factors is 
unstable and even unpredictable, as their negative impact might gradually 
grow, and the effect of their analysis is compounded over time.101  Thus, it 
must be approached using newer tools, both theoretical and doctrinal.  
Therefore, even the symbolic emphasis on sensitive factors might be 
misplaced and unnecessary. 
In conclusion, the rise of Big Data substantially undermines the logic 
and utility of applying a separate and expansive legal regime to “special 
categories” for various reasons.  For starters, there are practical 
considerations.  Attending to this distinction generates extensive and 
unnecessary regulatory costs.  Regulators on both the continental and 
domestic level will be required to ponder over the question as to whether 
various datasets and analyses fall within the special categories noted.  Courts 
will also need to weigh in on this unimportant question—which will be costly 
to all the parties involved.  Beyond costs, the current legal regime will 
generate substantial uncertainty, which will again impede on firms striving 
to engage in Big Data analysis, with smaller entities suffering the greatest 
harms given their inability to seek out costly legal advice.  Finally, given the 
symbolic justification to maintain the distinction here discussed between 
sensitive and other forms of data, it is important to emphasize other symbolic 
reasons to abandon the use of special categories.  If almost all data might fall 
under the “special” category, the signal and message this regulatory 
framework provides regarding the higher level of privacy due to special 
categories is subsequently diluted.  At the end of the day, there will be no 
real special treatment for these special categories as this stricter standard will 
 
  98   See also Rouvroy, supra note 10, at 16–17. 
  99   Id. 
  100   Id. 
  101   I thank Courtney Bowman for pointing out this observation.  See Moerel, supra note 
94, for “sensitive” in different contexts. 
ZARSKY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2017  7:37 PM 
2017] THE GDPR IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 1015 
be applied across the board.  This is not necessarily a good thing.  With time 
and given practical needs, even information within this special category will 
be processed regularly.  Thus, the entire aim of this regulatory regime which 
strives to provide special categories with special treatment is defeated and 
rendered meaningless—and the public will view all these forms of data as 
similar.102  In view of all the above, the impact Big Data will have on this 
regulatory aspect must be accounted for at once.  Even if some form of 
particular regime for special categories is to be considered, it must be applied 
narrowly.103 
D. Automated Decisions 
The GDPR’s article 22 sets forth a specific legal rule governing 
decision-making processes, which are both fully automated and substantially 
impact individuals, such as credit applications or recruiting.104  In this unique 
provision, EU law provides the individual with the right not to be subjected 
to these processes.  A similar general rule that specifically singles out such 
processes does not exist in American law.105 
This general rule includes several exceptions which nonetheless allow 
for such automated analyses to proceed—such as the data subject’s explicit 
consent.106  In addition, member states can authorize such a process, and it 
will also be permitted if deemed necessary to enter or perform a contract.107  
Such authorization and finding of necessity would most likely pertain to 
automated processes used to detect fraudulent activity, especially in financial 
contexts.108  It is unclear whether additional exceptions will be provided to 
other categories of analysis. 
Even when the noted exceptions apply, the data subject is provided with 
 
  102   Moerel & Prins, supra note 9, at 11 (arguing that this distinction is no longer 
“meaningful”). 
  103   For a recommendation to abolish these categories in the GDPR, see Moerel, supra 
note 94.  
  104   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 22, rec. 71.  
  105   Possible exceptions are U.S. credit reporting laws which require at some junctures that 
individuals be informed of the main factors affecting their credit score.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
1681g(f)(1)(C) (2012).  See also the discussion in Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, 
The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014).   
  106   GDPR, supra note 1, art. 22(2)(c). 
  107   Id. art. 22(3).  Article 22(4) further stipulates that the exceptions cannot be premised 
on the “special categories” noted in article 9(1) (and addressed in Part II(3) above).  Given 
the noted expansion of these categories in the big data age, this might further inhibit automated 
processes.  However, the GDPR still provides for a loophole, allowing for processing which 
meets the requirements of article 9(2)(a) or (g), which provide for the processing of such 
categories subject to explicit consent, or when there is a substantial public interest, subject to 
some additional safeguards.  These loopholes are quite broad and therefore article 22(4) will 
probably not prove to be a substantial obstacle. 
  108   GDPR, supra note 1, rec. 71.  
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several important rights when facing automated decisions: he or she has a 
right to “obtain human intervention” as well as the right to “contest the 
decision”109 (and express his or her point of view).  Furthermore, the GDPR 
provides data subjects with the right to access background data to enable 
such a contest.  In several other instances, and while addressing the right of 
“access” throughout the Regulation, the GDPR clearly indicates110 that when 
these automated processes unfold, the data subject must be informed of their 
existence, as well as provided with “meaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such 
processing for the data subject.”111 
The requirements article 22 sets forth could nonetheless be sidestepped 
relatively easily by inserting human intervention into the process.  In other 
words, once the process is not “solely” automated, this provision will not 
apply.112  It is of course too early to establish how courts and regulators will 
rule on issues related to this matter, and whether they might render some 
forms of limited human intervention fictitious and negligible, thus 
nonetheless subjecting article 22 and its requirements to various processes. 
The GDPR’s drafters did not pull article 22 out of thin air.  Indeed, a 
very similar rule was set forth in the DPD.113  However, this rule was rarely 
applied, and in many member states was in fact a dead letter.114  Furthermore, 
recent rulings in Germany further limited the rights the predecessors of 
article 22 provide by finding that firms can refrain from disclosing insights 
as to their automated internal processes, given their interest in protecting 
their trade secrets.115 
Several justifications could be provided to explain article 22 and its 
predecessors.  First, one can link this right to the notion of honor and respect; 
when faced with crucial decisions, a human should be treated with the 
 
  109   Id. art. 22(3). 
  110   Id. arts. 13(12)(f), 14(12)(g) & 15(1)(h).  
 111  Id. art. 13(2)(f).  Recital 71 goes further to note that an individual has the right to 
receive an “explanation” after the fact as to how the decision was reached.  Yet some scholars 
have questioned whether this statement is sufficiently backed by specific language in the 
actual articles of the Regulation.  See Wachter et al., supra note 9, at 11. 
  112   Note that one of the versions considered for article 22 called for applying it in 
situations which were “predominantly” automated—a version eventually abandoned during 
the legislative process.  See Wachter et al., supra note 9, at 32.  
  113   DPD, supra note 4, arts. 12(a), 15; Wachter et al., supra note 9, at 11 (explaining that 
the rules regarding this matter set out in the GDPR are very similar to those of the DPD). 
 114  Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, supra note 20, at 1551; Douwe Korff, Data 
Protection Laws in the EU: The Difficulties in Meeting the Challenges Posed by Global Social 
and Technical Developments 86 (European Comm’n Directorate-Gen. Justice, Freedom & 
Sec., Working Paper No. 2, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/ 
new_privacy_challenges/final_report_working_paper_2_en.pdf.  
  115   See Wachter et al., supra note 9, at 23. 
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dignity of having a human decision-maker address his or her personal 
matter.116  Second, the fact that these automated processes unfold without 
providing sufficient insights to those affected by it undermines the right to 
“due process.”117  Similarly, carrying out automated processes without 
sufficient supervision generates concerns that such processes are error-
ridden, discriminatory, tainted, and flawed.118  On a deeper level, this rule 
might reflect the distrust humans have towards computerized systems and 
machines generally—admittedly, a notion that might be no longer valid. 
Article 22 (and the “access” rights which pertain to the process it 
addresses) directly impacts Big Data practices.  Furthermore, in a recent 
report, Rouvroy admits that achieving the article’s objective in the Big Data 
age is “both unrealistic and deeply paradoxical.”119  The tension between Big 
Data and article 22 unfolds on several levels.  First, prohibiting automated 
analysis obviously undermines many of the Big Data practices discussed 
throughout this Article.  Second, even if one of the many exceptions to the 
prohibition on automation (such as limited human intervention) is met, the 
specific disclosures noted above which call for enabling a human response 
to the machines’ decisions are still required.  To meet these disclosure 
obligations, Big Data processes must be conducted in a manner that would 
assure they are interpretable—i.e., they can be explained to the inquiring 
individual.120  Constantly meeting an “interpretability” requirement might 
call upon those designing the automated processes to compromise some of 
the system’s precision to enable the delivery of this form of detailed 
disclosure.121  Third, allowing human interjection would further encumber 
the automated process and slow down the innovative technologies they bring 
about. 
Article 22 is perhaps the most salient example of the GDPR’s rejection 
of the Big Data revolution.  It signals a deep distrust towards these automated 
processes, yet does not specify why this attitude was adopted.  In response 
to this rule, it is possible that firms will indeed be required to substantially 
change their technological architectures and even business models, opting 
for less efficient practices which comply with this rule. 
However, it is very likely that of all the GDPR’s provisions discussed 
 
 116  Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, supra note 20, at 1551–52.  
  117   HILDEBRANDT, supra note 54, at 198.  
  118   These justifications could be derived from GDPR, supra note 1, rec. 71.  For a recent 
discussion of the flaws of automated and automatic processes, see generally Andrea Roth, 
Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245 (2016).  
  119   Rouvroy, supra note 10, at 34.   
 120  Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, supra note 20, at 1519.  
  121   Future research must establish the extent of the trade-off between interpretability and 
data mining efficiency.  If the costs of meeting interpretability are low, this critique is 
somewhat curbed. 
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thus far, article 22 will have the least effect in practice.  As noted, the 
provision could be sidestepped by inserting very minimal human interaction.  
In addition, the explanations set forth to meet legal requirements might be of 
very limited scope, while providing very general language.  Still, the 
powerful anti-Big Data gesture article 22 conveys will remain, and might be 
projected in regulatory decisions made in other contexts. 
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT’S NEXT FOR EUROPE? 
Part III illustrated a bleak outlook regarding the ability to engage in 
effective Big Data analysis in an EU governed by the GDPR.  It further 
addressed other negative effects these technologies will have on the GDPR’s 
coherence.  In this Part, the Article will briefly examine what the impact of 
the noted conclusions might be and what the existence of the GDPR’s current 
format might actually lead to.  In what follows, this Part will address three 
possible outcomes for Europe: one optimistic, one pessimistic, and in 
between them, a realistic forecast and point of view. 
Let us begin with some European optimism.  Here one might argue that 
the GDPR will march the citizens of Europe and even those of the entire 
world to a new era in which new forms of data analytics will dominate the 
markets—those that provide sufficient safeguards to protect fundamental 
rights and adhere to the other rules addressed in the Regulation.  When 
addressing this matter, Mireille Hildebrandt explains that EU data protection 
law might allow citizens to have their cake and eat it too; they will benefit 
from enhanced data protection, while enjoying the innovations enhanced 
data analytics bring about.122  Even if this preferable outcome would not be 
achievable, a balance between the interests will be struck to assure that only 
a proportionate breach of rights would occur. 
These optimistic dynamics need not be limited to the EU.  Given the 
GDPR’s international jurisdiction, this balanced outcome will migrate to 
other jurisdictions beyond the EU as well, in a process Anu Bradford refers 
to as the “Brussels Effect.”  Thus, the change the GDPR brings about will 
even affect global firms operating domestically in the United States, and thus 
American consumers and citizens.123  Even though the GDPR does not apply 
in the latter instance, multi-national firms will nonetheless comply with these 
norms in their domestic settings.  Given the high costs of complying with 
multiple regulatory regimes in the digital age, global firms might merely opt 
for complying with one regulatory model everywhere—and this would prove 
to be the stricter European model.  They might also choose to apply GDPR-
like rules to U.S. citizens due to fear of the public and political backlash that 
 
  122   HILDEBRANDT, supra note 54, at 211.  
  123   Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 64 (2012).  
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would follow disclosures that U.S. firms provide foreign customers with 
greater protection than American customers. 
This rosy prediction should be met with skepticism and pessimism.  At 
first, the noted global-political dynamic must be questioned.  Recent political 
trends of national separatism will most likely allow firms to justify different 
treatment in different countries.  Thus, the actions of U.S. businesses pushing 
back EU regulators will not be frowned upon by either the government or 
substantial segments of the public.  The same could most likely be said of 
the U.K.  Furthermore, even within the EU, there is no guarantee the public 
would be able to have their cake and eat it, too (as Mireille Hildebrandt 
argued).  Given the difficulties in carrying out Big Data analytics, local 
entrepreneurs will focus their innovative spirits elsewhere, or move to other 
countries where they could pursue their objectives and Big Data-related 
business models without disturbance.  Such outcomes will be harmful to the 
EU, as it will lead to the loss of income and jobs.  Furthermore, and at the 
end of the day, privacy interests might not be protected after all, as local EU 
residents might nonetheless turn to firms overseas to use their data analytic 
products and services.  The firms operating in these latter instances might 
indeed still be subjected to the GDPR’s jurisdiction, but enforcement of these 
situations will surely prove challenging.124  It is obviously difficult to predict 
which of these opposing scenarios will unfold, yet it is very likely both will 
occur in varying contexts. 
Between these two somewhat extreme predictions, a third, pragmatic 
forecast has been set forth.  It states that the GDPR provides sufficient forms 
of exceptions and loopholes to allow rich Big Data dynamics to nonetheless 
unfold.  For instance,125 Mayer-Schönberger and Padova argue that the 
GDPR can facilitate Big Data analysis, and that its introduction constitutes 
progress from the rules set out by the DPD.  They reach this conclusion after 
analyzing the same provisions discussed above, while highlighting the 
various (noted) instances in which member states are permitted to introduce 
exceptions which might enable some form of analyses.  They are also 
optimistic that at least some such states will indeed move ahead and 
introduce such exceptions. 
I certainly hope this noted scenario will indeed reflect reality in the near 
future, but will conclude by adding substantial skepticism towards this view 
as well.  While exceptions exist, the noted analysis outlined in the previous 
sections demonstrates that the GDPR’s overall narrative is quite clear—it 
views Big Data analysis as highly problematic.  It reintroduces article 22 
which directly clashes with the very foundations of the practices of Big Data 
 
  124   For a similar analysis, see Zarsky, The Privacy–Innovation Conundrum, supra note 7, 
at 161. 
  125   Mayer-Schönberger & Padova, supra note 48, at 315.  
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analysis; it continues to apply a layered approach to data protection (with 
“special” categories) which Big Data clearly renders unworkable.  In view 
of these two clear messages, local regulators will be reluctant to expand 
exceptions pertaining to other rules—mainly data minimization and purpose 
specification—which encumber the Big Data processes.  It is therefore fair 
to assume that the analysis set forth in Part III will hold, and that the 
pessimistic prediction noted above will eventually materialize. 
To conclude, it is very difficult to predict what the GDPR’s actual 
impact on Big Data analytics will prove to be, and vice versa.  Many 
factors—such as the effectiveness of the EU enforcement and fine 
mechanisms as well as the benefits the Big Data technologies will bring 
about—are still unclear.  Yet, the scenario that the GDPR’s incompatibility 
will lead to an impact that would be both negative and substantial must be 
taken under serious consideration.  While the EU’s strong position towards 
the protection of privacy rights is admirable, it is possible that the full 
implications the GDPR will have for the important Big Data practices, and 
their benefits, have not been fully and properly considered.  Therefore, the 
opinions here noted must be kept in mind as this new Regulation moves 
towards enactment and implementation. 
 
